“Obwohl die gestrige Entscheidung der Vereinigten Staaten sich aus 66 internationalen Organisationen zurückzuziehen – insbesondere vom IPCC und der UN Framework Convention on Climate Change -nicht überraschend kommt, unterstreicht dieser Schritt nochmals deutlich wie sich die Schwerpunkte in internationalen Klimaverhandlungen nachhaltig verändern. Schon vor COP30 waren diese Entwicklungen absehbar. Die dürftigen Ergebnisse dieser Verhandlungen unterstreichen einmal mehr wie sich die Interessen der Big Players verschoben haben. In einer Welt die durchwachsende geopolitische Spannung gekennzeichnet ist scheinen Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung des Klimawandels rapide an Bedeutung zu verlieren.”
Austrian Senior Expert Erich Unterwurzacher war einen Großteil seiner beruflichen Laufbahn in internationalen Organisationen tätig, u. a. bei der OECED und mehr als 20 Jahre in der EU-Kommission. Er hat seine Sichtweise zu der COP30 in einem lesenswerten Artikel zusammengefasst.
COP30: Did all go up in flames?
In Belém, on 20 November a fire broke out in one of the meeting areas of the conference. While it was extinguished rapidly, it did at that moment attract significant media attention. Even though the incident was forgotten quickly, it is however symptomatic for the turn international climate change negotiations took in recent years. The real issues lie much deeper than those flames. What has been achieved, have these results met expectations and do they justify annual high-level meetings of such scope and scale? These are questions for which answers must be found.
Let’s start with the results. Support for adaptation policies and actions was perhaps the most laudable outcome. The intention is to tripling climate adaptation finance by 2035. While this is not a binding commitment, it gives a political signal. Current funding falls far short of what vulnerable countries would need. A push to scale up resources over the next decade is needed to incentivise international institutions and national governments, even as the details on contributions still need to be negotiated. Implementing those commitments is far from assured, as a comparison with the fate of financial commitments given at earlier COPs would tell. Interestingly, the recognition of adaptation as a policy choice is in itself rather new. It has sometimes been criticised as accepting failure to limit long-term global warming to 1.5 degrees, and was considered a “cop-out”.
A further positive outcome is tackling deforestation and biodiversity loss as a priority, although no concrete roadmap was agreed to implement those commitments. And it can certainly be argued that there are other international bodies which are perhaps better suited to address those issues. Biodiversity and environmental degradation merit action on its own, should they be dealt as an add-on to climate negotiations?
Similarly, it is doubtful whether addressing trade issues in climate talks falls within the COP mandate. While the link between decarbonisation and the unrestricted availability of critical raw materials is undisputed, it is evident that ultimate agreements on trade policy go beyond climate negotiations. Given the particular importance of those materials not just for decarbonisation but also for other fields, in particular AI and – increasingly – defence and security, it is unlikely whether this subject can meaningfully be dealt with by COP, in particular in a changed geopolitical setting. This indicates a widening of the COP process to other policy areas, well beyond global warming: is there mission creep?
Overall, the achievements were disappointing when compared to previous meetings – the returns are diminishing. Most striking was the fact that no consensus was achieved on a roadmap for a global phase-out of coal, oil and gas. On this issue there is even a backsliding when compared to COP29 which on this matter gave some rise to optimism.
These meagre results were foreseeable if one carefully assesses global trends impacting those negotiations and their outcomes.
The three main actors, the US, the EU and China who account together for around half of global CO2 emissions, had, until recently – albeit to a varied degree, the political will, the economic power and the technological advantages to set the scene for global climate negotiations. In all these 3, changes took place which fundamentally altered their level of engagement. In different ways, these players have shifted their actions somewhere else or are using their weight for reasons only partly linked to meeting climate goals.
The US has developed into the world largest producer of hydrocarbons and has no intention to rescind this leading role; in fact, the opposite is true. Given the US’ economic might, geopolitical weight and its focus on domestic greatness, those changes will have the biggest short- and longer-term impact. It would certainly be naïve to assume that these are linked only to the incumbent administration.
The EU will not accelerate its course towards decarbonisation. The EU has agreed just before COP a CO2 reduction target for 2040, containing some softening after some painful internal discussions. EU member states may also not have any appetite to increase funding to third countries, given their persistently sluggish economic growth, squeezed national budgets and the political imperative to increase defence spending. Interestingly, just after COP30 the EU is set to adapt its target for phasing out internal combustion engines, and this for issues of competitiveness, a policy imperative now clearly outpacing decarbonisation initiatives. In this context it is important to note that the EU, the most vocal of the 3, accounts for only 6% of global emissions. Undoubtedly a success but it might also fuel arguments within the EU to scale down its efforts and readiness to provide finance, also internationally.
China has developed into a key player and emerges as the winner in international climate negotiations. It is increasing becoming a vanguard in climate policies. It is stepping into the void left by the US, and perhaps the EU as well. China’s technological edge in the field of renewables, its dominance in critical raw materials, its strategic engagement with the Global South makes it now perhaps the most reliable partner in the climate arena. The developments in China over recent years are the most striking. China’s CO2 emissions are flattening; this is impressive given the countries still significant GDP growth and need for further industrialisation. This trend is likely to have the most significant medium- and longer-term impact.
Both actors, the EU and China, will remain committed, for different reasons: the EU will maintain its political drive on world stage and China will use its competitive advantage of its green technologies as a major tool for economic growth.
One a more technical level, there are trends with lasting and substantial impact on global emission reductions. To name just one: driven by economic growth and climate policies, global electricity demand is increasing steadily and rapidly. It is also increasingly replacing fossil fuels in end-uses, like transport. Electricity production is more and more based on renewables – with PV the fastest growing source globally, low-carbon fuels, and resurging nuclear. Forecasts show that these trends are sent to continue, underpinned by policies, investment choices and favourable price developments. There is a double dividend of the age of electricity: it is replacing carbon-intensive fuels and it is increasingly produced by low – or no-carbon fuels.
International climate change negotiations need to adapt to these changes. It is questionable whether annual meetings of several thousand people are fit for purpose in a rapidly changing world. Undoubtedly, the Paris Agreement was instrumental in enhancing visibility in earlier decades, to put climate change on the international agenda, to foster international cooperation or to mobilise financing. But the world has moved on. By now, the COP process has lost its momentum. Climate policies have matured at international stage and COPxx’s marginal returns are quickly diminishing. Calls for ever new agreements, for funding by those countries in which priorities have shift and expanding in new areas not entirely linked to decarbonisation are a questionable avenue for action. Even the ritual of extending meetings beyond its scheduled closure has lost its impact. At COP30 this extension went almost unnoticed. Moreover, the road to decarbonisation is increasingly becoming decoupled from that process.
Yet, the need for an international arena to monitor commitments and their implementation, to adapt policies and finetune international agreements remains, and those actions should become the focus. Such a reorientation should be preceded be an honest and realistic assessment of the turns international climate negotiations have taken. Denying these trends is not the way forward, nor is it sustainable.
